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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate whether being part of the euro area influences the 
conditional probability of going through a sudden stop or a bonanza of capital flows. 
Our sample period is from 1995 until 2014. We identify these two phenomena and we 
evaluate which push and pull factors help predict the conditional probability of 
experiencing one of them. We find that most countries had significant capital inflows 
until 2008 and that there were more sudden stops during the recent financial crisis than 
in any other moment in our sample. The factors that better help forecast the conditional 
probability of a sudden stop are global uncertainty (represented by the push factor 
“Volatility Index”), and the domestic economic activity (pull factors “GDP growth” and 
“consumer confidence”). An indicator of country risk (pull factor “change in credit 
rating”) is the most significant one for predicting bonanzas. Ultimately, we find no 
evidence that being part of the euro area influences the conditional probability of going 
through a sudden stop or a bonanza.   
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High capital mobility creates challenges to policy makers (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999; 
Calvo, 2003). Bonanzas of capital flows consist in large and rapid increases of foreign 
capital inflows (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008), which can lead to lending booms and a 
rise in asset prices. They can also be followed by a sudden stop of capital flows. These 
sudden stops, on the other hand, are large and unexpected reductions in international 
capital flows (Calvo, 2003), which can limit the financing sources and, therefore, affect 
the total amount of output produced by an economy (Cúrdia, 2008). Moreover, they 
origin bankruptcies, currency or banking crisis and decrease the productivity of the 
existing capital stock (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004; 
Calvo, 1998).  
Sudden stops and bonanzas have been identified and extensively analyzed in the 
literature for emerging economies (e.g. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993; Chuhan, 
Claessens and Mamingi, 1993; Yazdani and Tayebi, 2012; Hutchison and Noy, 2006; 
Sula, 2006), but only a small number of authors studied them for Europe. During the 
recent financial crisis, sudden stops became more frequent and there was a reawakening 
of the debate about these extreme capital flow movements and the factors behind them. 
Some authors addressed the particular case of the EU (e.g. Alcidi and Gros, 2013; 
Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012), and some of them pointed out that the current account 
imbalances that had been accumulated over time with the significant capital flows from 
the core countries of the EU to the periphery were actually a reflection of the specific 
problems that were affecting some countries (Alcidi and Gros, 2013). This adverse 
environment eventually led to a sudden stop in the capital flows to the periphery 
countries, although the financing channel of the Euro system protected the banking 
systems of the euro countries from its immediate effects (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; 
Alcidi and Gros, 2013).  Nevertheless, other authors argued that being part of the euro 
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area let the countries more vulnerable and exposed to these capital flow reversals (e.g 
Paul de Grauwe, 2011)
1
. Still, none of the existing literature actually formally tested if 
being part of the euro area amplified these vulnerabilities. Therefore, in our paper we 
contribute to the literature by analyzing if being part of the euro area influences the 
conditional probability of a sudden stop or of a bonanza, distinguishing between euro 
and non-euro countries. In contrast to previous studies which focus in a broad variety of 
countries or only in emerging economies, we focus on all European Union countries 
from 1995 until 2014. We follow the methodology of Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) to 
identify these extreme capital flow movements, and we test for the most relevant push 
and pull factors that explain them following the approach suggested by Forbes and 
Warnock (2011). We then add a dummy variable for the euro area to test the hypothesis 
of whether being part of the euro area influences (or not) the probability of a sudden 
stop or of a bonanza. In line with the existing literature, we divided the determinants of 
capital flows into push - external variables outside the country’s control - and pull 
factors - related to domestic economic conditions and policies- (e.g Calvo, Leiderman 
and Reinhart, 1993).  
We discover that there were significant capital inflows for most EU countries until 2008 
and that there were more sudden stops during the recent financial crisis than in any 
other moment in our sample, although the precise timing in which these sudden stops 
occurred varied across countries. Moreover, almost all countries had a huge drop in 
private capital inflows at some point between 2008 and 2012, even though some of 
them did not reach a sudden stop. We also find evidence that proportionally, euro 
countries experienced more bonanzas, but also more sudden stops, than the non-euro 
                                                          
1 “Because of the liquidity flows triggered by changing market sentiments, member countries of a monetary union 
become vulnerable to these market sentiments. These can lead to “sudden stops” in the funding of the government 
debt (Calvo 1988), setting in motion a devilish interaction between liquidity and solvency crises. For the liquidity 
crisis raises the interest rate which in turn leads to a solvency crisis. This problem is not unique for members of a 
monetary union. It has been found to be very important in emerging economies that cannot issue debt in their own 
currencies.” De Grauwe,  Paul. 2011. “Managing a Fragile Eurozone” (Voxeu article) 
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ones. In addition, we test which push and pull factors are more important in determining 
the conditional probability of going through one of these phenomena. We find that 
global uncertainty (represented by the push factor “Volatility Index”) and the domestic 
economic activity (pull factors “GDP growth” and “consumer confidence”) are the most 
consistently significant factors to predict the probability of experiencing a sudden stop. 
On the other hand, the indicator of country risk (pull factor “change in credit rating”) is 
the one that better helps forecast bonanzas. Our findings are accordingly to the recent 
theoretical literature that argues that global risk is the main source of crises, but suggest 
that in this particular period global liquidity has not been a major driver of capital flows. 
Ultimately, we find no evidence that being part of the euro area influences the 
probability of going through a sudden stop or a bonanza. 
As to the structure of the paper, section 2 reviews the literature on sudden stops, 
bonanzas and push and pull factors, as determinants of capital flows; section 3 focuses 
on our identification of sudden stops and bonanzas; section 4 reports the estimation 
strategy used to discover what are the most relevant push/pull factors, the results 
associated with it and the sensitivity tests performed; and section 5 presents the final 
remarks. 
2. A Brief Literature Review 
A. Sudden Stops and Bonanzas 
Economic theory argues that free capital movement across countries is beneficial since 
it leads to an efficient allocation of resources, faster capital accumulation, technological 
catch up and economic growth. Nevertheless, large fluctuations of capital flows can also 
create challenges for policy makers (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999; Calvo, 2003). 
Bonanzas (or surges) are characterized by large and rapid increases of foreign capital 
inflows (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008). They can have negative impacts on a country’s 
competitiveness through an appreciation of the real exchange rate and they can cause an 
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increase in the asset prices, lending booms and financial risks. Moreover, since they are 
temporary events, they can eventually end up in sudden stops (Montiel, 2003). 
Calvo (2003) described sudden stops as large, clear and unexpected reductions in 
international capital flows. These phenomena limit the financing sources and, therefore, 
affect the total amount of output produced by an economy (Cúrdia, 2008). After going 
through a sudden stop, the country needs to adjust through a reversal of the current 
account (unless it receives a large balance of payments assistance), which in general 
comes with a contraction of the economic activity. Often, central banks are induced to 
raise interest rates in order to reduce the drain of capital (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 
2004). Moreover, sudden stops can origin bankruptcies, currency or banking crisis and 
decrease the productivity of the existing capital stock (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999; 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004; Calvo, 1998). These phenomena also lead to 
monetary policy challenges by causing higher volatility of inflation, output and interest 
rates (Fraga et al, 2003).  
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) analyzed extreme capital flow movements for Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Italy, and found that all of these countries experienced 
sudden stops at some point between 2002 and 2011. In particular, they showed that 
sudden stops were concentrated in 2008, the spring of 2010 and the second half of 2011. 
Alcidi and Gros (2013) considered only GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) and BELL (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) countries, and found that 
non-euro countries had a shorter and more acute adjustment after a sudden stop than the 
euro ones. They argued that the main possible causes for this difference were the 
availability of credit, and different fiscal policies and patterns of bank ownership. 
B. Determinants of Capital Flows: Push and Pull Factors 
Push factors are external variables outside the host (capital importing) country’s control. 
Examples of push factors are global shocks to liquidity, risk/uncertainty and asset 
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prices. Pull factors, on the other hand, are related to domestic economic conditions, 
policies and performance, as well as the country’s institutions and creditworthiness. 
Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) were pioneers in discussing the determinants of 
capital flows and distinguishing between push and pull factors. They believed it were 
push factors (such as a decrease in interest rates and recession in some industrial 
countries) that drove capital flows to emerging economies. Fernandez-Arias (1996) 
argued about the importance of push factors (in particular, low US interest rates) in the 
evolution of capital flows to emerging economies, stating that these low international 
interest rates allowed some highly-indebted countries to improve their creditworthiness 
and increase their capital inflows. Conversely, other authors considered that capital 
flows for emerging economies were instead more driven by pull factors (see for 
example, Mody, Taylor and Kim, 2001; Dasgupta and Ratha, 2000). Montiel and 
Reinhart (1999) stressed that these two factors were complementary for developing 
countries: push factors determined the timing and scale of the flows, while pull factors 
determined their geographical distribution.  
As for the recent financial crisis, Fratzscher (2011) analyzed data for advanced and 
emerging economies, and found that push factors (mainly, shocks to liquidity and risk) 
were important drivers of capital flows from 2005 to 2008. However, since 2009, pull 
factors seemed to better explain the pattern of capital flows, in particular for emerging 
economies. Forbes and Warnock (2011) included over fifty emerging and developed 
countries in their sample and showed that surges, flight, retrenchment and stop 
phenomena had some global, contagion and domestic components, even though the 
most important were the first ones. Ghosh et. al. (2012) argued that global factors were 
more likely to be responsible for the occurrence of an inflow surge in an emerging 
economy, while domestic factors were more likely to be responsible for the size of it.  
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3. Identifying Sudden Stops and Bonanzas 
The first step of our investigation is to identify episodes of bonanzas and of sudden 
stops in our sample, which consists in all EU countries from 1995 to 2014. In doing so, 
we first need to define a measure of capital flows in which our calculations will be 
based. We follow the methodology of Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) who constructed a 
measure of “private” capital inflows which consisted in the financial account as a 
whole, net of official inflows from changes in Target 2 balances and assistance under 
IMF/EU programs (refer to table 1 in appendix for alternative measures of private 
capital inflows). This measure allows us to get a better understanding of the capital 
flows during this period and to get more realistic results. Unlike Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012), we use quarterly data for the financial account obtained from Eurostat, 
since most of the sources that had this data available for all EU countries only offered 
this or annual frequency. The monthly values for Target 2 balances are from the 
“Eurocrisis Monitor” and were adapted to quarterly data by assigning the values 
available for March, June, September and December to the first, second, third and 
fourth quarters, respectively. We consider this data from the earliest period available, 
even though it is not the same for all European countries. The inflows from assistance 
under IMF/EU programs are from the European Commission and the IMF. They were 
also only available at a monthly frequency, so we adapted them to quarterly data by 
grouping them together. Data on IMF disbursements were on SDRs and were converted 
to Euros using end of period exchange rates. We take into account all the countries that 
are currently part of the European Union, even though some of them weren’t at the 
beginning of the data under analysis. France is excluded from our sample because of 
data availability. After calculating our measure of “private” capital inflows for all 
countries in each quarter, we compute the total (financial account) and “private” 








Figure 1 represents this for Portugal and Cyprus and also offers evidence about the 
sudden stops and bonanzas that they experienced. The remaining graphs are reported in 
appendix.  
Figure 1: Total and Private Capital Inflows, Cumulated (in % of 2007 GDP) 
Note: The blue line represents total inflows and the red line stands for “private” capital inflows.                                                                                                   
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Eurostat, Euro Crisis Monitor, the IMF and the European 
Commission. 
These cumulative graphs show that Cyprus experienced a drop in “private” capital 
inflows during the second quarter of 2008, and that Portugal also suffered a tremendous 
decrease in these inflows in the first quarter of 2010.  
Looking at the cumulative graphs of all EU countries, some of them always presented 
financial account surpluses between 1995 and 2014. Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden had financial account deficits at some point. 
Our measure of “private” capital inflows suggests that most countries experimented 
significant capital inflows until the 2008 financial crisis and that a lot of them had 
sudden stops and capital outflows afterwards, as a result of the economic environment. 
The outflows were particularly large for southern European countries such as Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Cyprus. The outflows were also significant, although 
smaller, for countries like Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary and Romania. 






Ireland, Latvia and Hungary outflows started earlier (2008/2009), while in Portugal, 
Spain and Italy outflows began in 2010/2011.  
Note that some of the bonanzas and sudden stops that we identify are a reflection of 
what was going on in other countries. That is, some countries (like Sweden, 
Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Luxembourg) experienced “surges” 
during the 2008 financial crisis because the capital that was flowing out of some 
countries went to these ones that were not in such bad conditions. Similarly, in 2013, 
Germany, Netherlands and Finland had a “sudden stop” due to the improved conditions 
that were felt in the periphery countries and that made capital flow from the former to 
these ones. 
Having defined a measure of “private” capital flows, we now use the methodology 
proposed by Calvo et. al (2004) to identify the episodes of bonanzas and of sudden 
stops in our sample. Although, there are many alternative definitions of sudden stops 
and bonanzas (see table 2 in appendix for a detailed description of these definitions), we 
choose Calvo et. al’s (2004) approach because it allows us to detect the moment in 
which a sudden stop or surge occurred and their duration, (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 
2012), and also because it captures the “unexpected” and “persistent” part of these 
phenomena (Calvo et. al, 2004).  
Following Calvo et al. (2004), we define a criterion to identify surges and sudden stops 
based on a threshold: a sudden stop starts when the year-over-year change in “private” 
capital inflows goes through the one standard deviation (bellow its historical rolling 
mean) line (“unexpected” part of a sudden stop) and it ends when it crosses back that 
same line, provided that the year-over-year change in “private” capital inflows falls 
below the two standard deviation line at some point between that (“persistent” part of a 
sudden stop). The same reasoning applies to bonanzas but with the threshold being one 
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standard deviation above the historical rolling mean. Although Calvo et al.(2004) used 
monthly data, we adapted it to fit our quarterly data, following Forbes and Warnock 
(2011). First, we compute a 4-quarter moving sum of St and year-over-year changes in 
St. Then, we calculate historical rolling means and standard deviations of these year-
over-year changes in St over the last twenty quarters. Since we compute historical 
rolling means and standard deviations over the last twenty quarters, we can only 
identify these phenomena from the third quarter of 2001 until 2014. For some countries, 
however, the identification starts a bit after 2001 because the necessary data to calculate 
private capital inflows is only available after 1999 (refer to table 3 in appendix for a 
thorough description of the period representation). 
Figure 2 shows the year-over-year changes in “private” capital inflows and the 
corresponding thresholds for Spain and Latvia, using Calvo et. al’s (2004) approach. 
The remaining graphs are presented in appendix. 


















These graphs suggest that during the recent financial crisis, Spain experienced a sudden 
stop from the fourth quarter of 2011 until the third quarter of 2012, and a “bonanza” 
between the first quarter of 2013 and the fourth quarter of 2013. Latvia, on the other 
hand, had a sudden stop from the second quarter of 2008 until the first quarter of 2010. 
Through the analysis of these graphs and the ones in appendix it is evident that almost 
all countries had a huge drop in “private” capital inflows at some point between 2008 
and 2012, even though some of them did not reach a sudden stop. Moreover, the graphs 
show that “private” capital inflows were much less volatile before the 2008 financial 
crisis.  
Besides the previously mentioned measure of “private” capital inflows (baseline 
measure), we computed one which excludes foreign direct investment (FDI), since it is 
argued that this type of capital flow is driven by long term profit opportunities and, 
hence, less likely to be disturbed by short term changes in market sentiment (Levchenko 
and Mauro, 2006). When we took FDI from our measure of “private” capital inflows, 
the periods of sudden stop and bonanza changed significantly for several countries, and 
we identified much more periods of bonanzas than with the baseline measure. 
Taking into account the baseline measure of “private” inflows, figure 3 represents the 
number of countries that experienced sudden stops (red bars) and surges (green bars) 
in each quarter. 
Note: The black line represents the year-over-year change in “private” capital inflows, the red line stands for the two 
standard deviation threshold and the green one for the one standard deviation threshold. 
 





Figure 3: Countries in Sudden Stop and Bonanza 
 
 
This figure shows that there was a tremendous increase in sudden stops during the 2008  
crisis. Moreover, there were more countries experiencing sudden stops in the first 
quarter of 2010 and more experiencing surges in the second and fourth quarters of 2006 
and second quarter of 2007. The graph for the measure of “private” capital inflows 
without FDI was similar to this one. Figure 4 shows two analogous charts in which we 
separated the EU between euro and non-euro countries.  
Figure 4: Euro and Non-Euro Countries in Sudden Stop and in Bonanza (in % of 
total EU countries) 
Euro Countries 







These last two graphs show that there were more euro countries experiencing bonanzas, 
but also more sudden stops than the non-euro ones between 2001 and 2014.  
Table 3 in appendix presents an exhaustive list of all sudden stops, surges and 
respective dates for each country between 2001 and 2014. From this table, we are able 
to distinguish a number of “waves” in terms of capital inflows and capital flow 
reversals. These “waves” were 2001 and 2002: The terrorist attacks to the US, the 
increase in oil prices, and the burst of the dot-com bubble in 2000 deeply affected the 
EU countries. As a result, capital started flowing out of some EU countries; 2003 to 
2006: In May 2004, ten new members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta) joined the EU. Due to the 
positive expectations from this adhesion and the favorable economic environment, they 
experienced bonanzas.
2
 Also, countries like Bulgaria and Romania had a surge of 
capital inflows due to successful economic policies that were implemented and an 
increasingly secure EU accession in the near future; 2007: Given the attractive 
economic conditions, some countries were experiencing a boom by 2007, with surges of 
                                                          
2
 Although we aren’t able to identify surges for all of these countries through Calvo et. al’s (2004)  
method, we observe in the cumulative graphs that private capital inflows continue to rise during this 
period. 
Non- Euro Countries 
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Eurostat, Euro crisis monitor, the IMF and the European 
Commission 




capital flows, unsustainable growth, strong leveraging and the development of bubbles 
in the real estate sector. This started to give rise to large imbalances, financial 
vulnerabilities and overheating; 2008 and 2009: After the Lehman-Brothers bank filed 
for bankruptcy, many EU countries experienced a sharp reversion of capital flows due 
to a decrease in demand and output; 2010: From 2009 to 2010, financial market 
conditions improved and a small and uneven recovery started to take place due to 
exceptional crisis measures that were implemented. Nevertheless, Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland asked for external help; 2011 and 2012: The international economic conditions 
deteriorated and the sovereign debt crisis aggravated, causing more capital outflows; 
2013: Some of the periphery countries of the EU that had entered a recession in 2008 
started to show signs of recovery and, consequently, experienced a “surge” in capital 
flows.  
4. Uncovering the Determinants of Capital Flows 
A. Data and Methodology 
After discovering the sudden stops and surges that occurred between 2001 and 2014, we 
assess which push and pull factors better help forecast the conditional probability of 
going through one of these phenomena and, ultimately, if being part of the euro area 
influenced it. 
We decide to choose Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States as the 
“center economies”, where capital is flowing from. Hence, these are the countries 
considered for the push factors.  
Recent authors suggested a division of push factors can be divided into risk (Bacchetta 
and Van Wincoop, 2010); liquidity and credit (Brunnermeier, 2009); wealth and 
leverage (Dedola and Lombardo, 2010; Devereux and Yetman, 2010). As for the pull 
factors, the literature has emphasized four main domestic economic fundamentals: size 
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and strength of the financial system (Forbes, 2010); financial market liberalization 
(Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010); growth and productivity (Broner et al., 2010). In order 
to capture some of these different factors, we selected the following variables as push 
factors: the Volatility Index (VIX) from the Chicago Board Options Exchange as a 
measure of global risk, and the year-over-year growth in money and quasi-money (M2) 
as a measure of global liquidity. Although many authors include interest rates among 
the push factors, we decide not to because they can be a cause but also an effect of 
sudden stops or bonanzas. In addition, the large interest rate cuts made by Central 
Banks in response to the 2008 financial crisis would change the expected sign for the 
regression’s coefficient.  
As for the pull factors, we focus on a consumer confidence index; the change in 
sovereign credit rating, which reflects the issuer’s creditworthiness and its ability to 
meet its debt obligations; public debt to GDP ratio, as an indicator of the country’s 
fiscal position and leverage; and the real GDP growth. 
The monthly values for the push factor “VIX” and for the pull factor “consumer 
confidence” were converted through quarterly averages. We consider the M2 stock for 
the EU (push factor) as the one for the ECB. Furthermore, data for the real GDP was at 
an annual frequency and it was transformed to quarterly using the “frequency 
conversion” function of Eviews. We use the S&P’s credit rating (local currency long 
term debt) and changed it into a quantitative variable by assigning a number to each 
rating, with the lowest value corresponding to the highest rating (AAA = 1). Through 
this attribution, we implicitly assume that there is an equal probability of moving from 
one rating to another, no matter the rating position that you are in at that moment or that 
you were in the past. In the regressions, we use the change in credit rating since it is a 
better representation of the deteriorating/improving creditworthiness of a country. We 
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also use the change in public debt because the original variable had a unit root (not 
stationary). Moreover, in order measure if we have a multicollinearity problem in our 
regressions, we calculate the correlations between independent variables (see figure 5 in 
appendix). In our calculations, we assume that the conditional probability of being in a 
sudden stop or surge today does not depend on being in sudden stop or surge in the 
previous period.  
After having all the necessary data, we initially estimate a probit model following 
Forbes and Warnock (2011): 
(1) 
where eit is a dummy variable, equal to one if the country is experiencing a surge or a 
stop phenomenon in quarter t; θt-1 is a measure of the push factor in the previous 
quarter; and αi are country dummy variables. At this point, we consider only one push 
factor at a time and leave the pull factors to be captured in the country dummies.  Again 
following Forbes and Warnock (2011), we estimate equation (1) using a complementary 
logarithmic since sudden stops and bonanzas do not occur in a regular, but in a skewed 
way and, therefore, the cumulative distribution function is not symmetric. Moreover, in 
order to be able to correctly interpret the coefficient results, we compute the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables. We can’t simply interpret the coefficients as in a 
linear regression because in a complementary logarithmic model they are exponential. 
Afterwards, we use a similar model but with more push and pull factors, to find out 
specifically which ones are more relevant to explain the probability of going through a 
sudden stop or bonanza. That is, we estimate the equation:                                                                       
                                         (2) 




Instead of estimating a probit model, Fratzscher (2011), for example, used a factor 
model with a set of push and pull factors and a financial crisis dummy variable, and 
Hernández and Rudolph (1997) estimated a model in which the dependent variable was 
the total long-term private flows in percentage of GNP and the independent variables 
were economic indicators such as the volatility of the real effective exchange rate and 
US interest rates. 
Note that the number of observations varies between regressions because we have to 
exclude from our calculations the countries that don’t have any sudden stops or 
bonanzas (the dependent variable is always equal to zero) during the period under 
analysis. We also perform several sensitivity analysis applying a different estimation 
method (probit instead of the complementary logarithmic); using additional 
“interaction” variables; focusing only in the countries that experienced sudden stops 
during the crisis period (between the first quarter of 2008 and the last quarter of 2010); 
and concentrating exclusively on GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and 













                   Baseline                 Without FDI








-0.0374    
(0.0280)
Country dummies χ2 *** χ2 *** χ2 *** χ2 ***










Country dummies χ2 *** χ2 *** χ2 *** χ2 ***
Observations 1300 1144 1144 1144
B. Empirical Results 
The table below shows the results obtained for regression (1) for both phenomena. 
 
It reports the respective marginal effects, standard deviations (in brackets) and 
significance levels for each variable. We also compute a    joint significance test for 
the country dummies. Considering our baseline measure of “private” capital inflows, 
VIX and M2 growth are highly significant when predicting sudden stops, but not 
significant for surges. VIX presents a marginal effect of 0,0660 for sudden stops, which 
indicates that for each unit increase in VIX, the conditional probability of going through 
a sudden stop goes up by an estimated 6,6%, ceteris paribus. That is, in periods of high 
volatility and uncertainty, capital is more likely to stop flowing to countries. M2 
growth, on the other hand, is negatively correlated with the probability of sudden stops: 
if there is a one unit increase in the year-over-year growth in M2, the probability of 
experiencing a sudden stop decreases by 20,32%, ceteris paribus. Since this variable is a 
measure of global liquidity, it is expected that when it increases (through quantitative 




               Baseline                 Without FDI









-0.0302     
(0.0275)
M2 growth (liquidity)


















Change in public debt 



















0.2964*     
(0.1747)
Euro Area Dummy
0.0474    
(0.2931)
-0.2872     
(0.2969)
-0.0467    
(0.2170)
0.1530     
(0.1648)
Observations 1272 1122 1119 1122
easing or an equivalent measure), sudden stops of capital flows to other countries 
become less frequent. Furthermore, the    tests for the country dummies indicate that 
they are jointly statistically significant in the two regressions. For our “private” capital 
inflows’ measure “without FDI”, the variable “growth in M2” becomes significant 
when forecasting bonanzas. 
The tables below report the results for two additional regressions, in which we assess 
the effects of specific push and pull factors in determining the probability of going 
through one of these two phenomena. In regression (A) we use GDP growth as one of 
the pull factors, and in the other one (B) we use the consumer confidence index instead. 
Since these two variables are highly correlated, we can’t include them simultaneously in 

















                 Baseline                 Without FDI









-0.0316      
(0.0342)
M2 growth (liquidity) -0.1127              
(0.0998)
0.1139    
(0.0974)






index (activity) -0.0338**  
(0.0159)




0.0111   
(0.0277)
Change in public debt 




0.0367    
(0.0512)
0.0474*   
(0.0249)
0.0548   
(0.0594)
Change in credit 
rating 
(creditworthiness)
-0.0641      
(0.1061)
0.4690**     
(0.1902)
-0.2596**       
(0.1167)
0.3028*     
(0.17402)
Euro Area Dummy -0.0577    
(0.2818)
-0.2935    
(0.2863)
-0.0563    
(0.1989)
0.1403    
(0.1741)















Considering the baseline measure of “private” capital inflows, we estimate regression 
(A) and find that VIX, GDP growth and change in public debt are significant in 
predicting the probability of sudden stops. However, only the change in credit rating is 
meaningful for bonanzas.  The results for regression (B) are similar, with the alternative 
variable “consumer confidence index” also being statistically significant for sudden 
stops. For both regressions, higher levels of risk are positively associated with sudden 
stops. On the contrary, higher GDP growth and consumer confidence are negatively 
connected to them. That is, when there is more growth in the economy or the consumer 
confidence rises, sudden stops are less likely to occur. We also find evidence that when 
a country is more publicly indebted, sudden stops’ conditional probability goes up. For 
the “private” capital inflows’ measure “without FDI”, VIX, GDP growth (or consumer 




confidence) and the change in public debt remain significant for sudden stops, and the 
change in credit rating becomes relevant for both types of phenomena, reporting a 
positive coefficient for bonanzas and a negative one for sudden stops. Therefore, when 
the change in credit rating decreases by one unit, there is a higher risk of default which 
discourages capital flows to that country and makes sudden stops more likely. 
Moreover, for this particular measure, M2 growth is a significant push factor for 
bonanzas in regressions (A) and (B). We find no evidence that being part of the euro 
area influences the probability of experiencing a sudden stop or a surge since the “euro 
area dummy variable” is never significant.  
In order to have a more thorough empirical analysis, we conduct a series of sensitivity 
tests on the results, to determine if that would modify our conclusions. We discover that 
forecasting the regressions with a probit (instead of a complementary logarithmic) 
model gives identical results. In addition, we estimate the regressions with additional 
“interaction terms” between the euro area dummy and the pull factors to see if being 
part of the euro area along with one of these variables would be significant to predict 
these two phenomena. We find that in the baseline measure the “interaction” term with 
the variable “growth in M2” and the one with “GDP growth” (or “consumer 
confidence” for regression B) are highly significant for bonanzas and have a negative 
coefficient. This negative correlation indicates that if one these indicators varies x, the 
probability of going through a surge varies less x than compared to the situation in 
which the country does not belong to the euro area (dummy variable is equal to zero). 
Also, the “interaction” with the change in public debt is relevant for forecasting 
bonanzas and sudden stops in the baseline measure of “private” capital inflows. For 
bonanzas, for example, if the change in public debt varies x, the probability of 
experiencing a bonanza varies more x than in the situation in which the country is not a 
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part of the euro area. Furthermore, when focusing exclusively in the crisis period and in 
the countries that experienced sudden stops during that time, we find no evidence that 
the euro area dummy variable is significant for predicting these phenomena. This last 
sensitivity analysis allows us to distinguish between the countries that actually suffered 
unexpected drops of capital inflows and the ones that only did because they functioned 
as a “refuge” of capital flows from other countries during the financial crisis. 
Finally, we estimate a regression considering only Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain (GIIPS) and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (BELL) following the same 
approach as Alcidi and Gros (2013). In their paper, they argued that the ECB let the 
euro countries maintain current account deficits for longer periods, allowing a slower 
and less sharp correction of the imbalances in the euro area.  Hence, they believed that 
the ECB was the main difference between the adjustment of the euro countries and the 
non-euro area ones, who didn’t have a similar institution. Our results do not give 
support to their claim since in this regression, the euro area dummy variable remains 
insignificant for forecasting the conditional probability of experiencing sudden stops 
and bonanzas. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The recent financial crisis was accompanied by a tremendous increase in capital flow 
volatility and an exceptional number of sudden stops. There was a reawakening of the 
debate about these extreme capital flow movements and the factors behind them, with 
some authors addressing the particular case of the EU. Some of them believed that 
being part of the euro area let the countries more vulnerable and exposed to these capital 
flow reversals, but none formally tested it. 
In our paper, we use a methodology that allows us to test if being part of the euro area 
influenced the conditional probability a sudden stop or a bonanza. We follow the 
approach of Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) to identify sudden stops and bonanzas and 
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we estimate which push or pull factors are more important to predict the probability of 
going through one of these phenomena, following Forbes and Warnock’s (2011). We 
then add a dummy variable for the euro area to test the hypothesis of whether being part 
of the euro area influences (or not) the probability of a sudden stop or of a bonanza. 
Our analysis finds that almost all countries experienced considerable capital inflows 
from until 2008. Afterwards, they decreased sharply and a lot of countries went through 
a sudden stop during the financial crisis. The outflows were substantial for periphery 
countries such as Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain, and for Eastern countries 
like Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania. Moreover, through our 
method we identify several episodes in which most sudden stops and bonanzas are 
clustered and are able to relate them to the economic environment of that particular 
moment. As for the push and pull factors, global uncertainty (represented by the push 
factor “Volatility Index”) and the domestic economic activity (pull factors “GDP 
growth” and “consumer confidence”) are the most consistently significant ones to 
predict the probability of experiencing a sudden stop. The indicator of country risk (pull 
factor “change in credit rating”) is the one that better helps forecast bonanzas. Hence, 
our estimations suggest that sudden stops are driven by push and pull factors, while 
bonanzas are driven only by pull factors. Although we find that euro countries 
experienced more bonanzas and more sudden stops than the non-euro ones, we don’t 
find any significant evidence that being part of the euro area alone influences the 
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"Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing 
View of the Past and Present", Carmen M. 
Reinhart and Vincent R. Reinhart (2008)
Reserve accumulation minus the current 
account balance
"Capital Flow Waves: Surges, Stops, Flight 
and Retrenchment", Kristin J. Forbes and 
Francis E. Warnock (2011)
Quarterly current account balance minus 
monthly changes in international reserves
"Private Capital Inflows and the Role of 
Economic Fundamentals", Vittorio Corbo and 
Leonardo Hernández (1998)
Sum of foreign direct investment, portfolio 
equity flows and long-term private debt 
flows; or consider each of one of them 
separately
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"On the Empirics of Sudden 
Stops", Calvo, Izquierdo, and 
Mejía (2004)
A sudden stop starts when the year-over-year change in capital flows 
is one standard deviation bellow its mean, and it ends when it is one 
standard deviation above its mean. Moreover, the year-over-year 
change in capital flows must be at least two standard deviations bellow 
the mean at some point within that interval for the episode to be 
considered a sudden stop.
"On the Consequences of 
Sudden Stops", Guidotti, 
Sturzenegger, and Villar 
(2004)
This approach states that sudden stops occur when the change in the 
capital account (divided by GDP) is one standard deviation bellow the 
mean and bellow 5% of GDP.
"Do Some Forms of Financial 
Flows Help Protect From 
Sudden Stops", Levchenko 
and Mauro (2006)
A sudden stop episode takes place when the financial account balance 
gets worse by more than 5 percentage points of GDP compared to the 
period before.
"Capital Flow Bonanzas", 
Reinhart and Reinhart 
(2008)
This study identifies bonanzas using a threshold: cutoff of 20th 
percentile of total net capital flows in percentage of GDP.
"Surges and Sudden Stops of 
Capital Flows to Emerging 
Markets", Sula (2006)
There is a period of bonanza when the increase in capital inflows as a 
percentage of GDP over a 3-year period is greater than 3% and the 
value of inflows as a percentage of GDP in that year is greater than 3%.
"Overreaction in Capital 
Flows to Emerging Markets: 
Booms and Sudden Stops", 
Agosin and Huaita (2010)
This paper recognizes a surge when the inflows exceed the sample 
mean by at least one standard deviation and the ratio of capital inflows 
to GDP is greater than 3%.












                Baseline               Without FDI
Countries Start Date Countries Start Date
Austria 1995 Q1 Austria 1995 Q1
Belgium 2002 Q1 Belgium 2002 Q1
Bulgaria 1995 Q1 Bulgaria 1995 Q1
Croatia 1999 Q1 Croatia 1999 Q1
Cyprus 2001 Q1 Cyprus 2001 Q1
Czech Republic 1995 Q1 Czech Republic 1995 Q1
Denmark 1995 Q1 Denmark 1997 Q1
Estonia 1995 Q1 Estonia 1995 Q1
Finland 1995 Q1 Finland 1995 Q1
France NA France NA
Germany 1995 Q1 Germany 1995 Q1
Greece 1995 Q1 Greece 1995 Q1
Hungary 1995 Q1 Hungary 1995 Q1
Ireland 1995 Q1 Ireland 1995 Q1
Italy 1995 Q1 Italy 1995 Q1
Latvia 1995 Q1 Latvia 1995 Q1
Lithuania 1995 Q1 Lithuania 1995 Q1
Luxembourg 2002 Q1 Luxembourg 2002 Q1
Malta 1995 Q1 Malta 1995 Q1
Netherlands 1995 Q1 Netherlands 1995 Q1
Poland 2000 Q1 Poland 2000 Q1
Portugal 1995 Q1 Portugal 1995 Q1
Romania 1995 Q1 Romania 1996 Q1
Slovakia 1995 Q1 Slovakia 1995 Q1
Slovenia 1995 Q1 Slovenia 1995 Q1
Spain 1995 Q1 Spain 1995 Q1
Sweden 1995 Q1 Sweden 1995 Q1
United Kingdom 1995 Q1 United Kingdom 1995 Q1



























Note: The table shows the European Union countries and the corresponding dates 






                                                          Baseline                               Without FDI
         Sudden Stops            Bonanzas        Sudden Stops           Bonanzas
Countries Start Date End Date Start Date End Date Start Date End Date Start Date End Date
Austria
Q3 2008 Q4 2008
Q3 2001   
Q3 2009
Q4 2001  
Q4 2009 Q2 2003 Q3 2003    
Q3 2001   
Q2 2008   
Q4 2009
Q4 2001   
Q2 2008   
Q4 2009 
Belgium
Q3 2008 Q3 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2010 - -
Q3 2009    
Q4 2012
Q4 2009  
Q2 2013
Bulgaria
Q4 2008 Q3 2010 Q1 2005 Q3 2008
Q3 2005       
Q3 2009
Q3 2005     
Q3 2010
Q4 2005    
Q4 2007
Q4 2005   
Q4 2008
Croatia
Q2 2009 Q4 2010 - - Q1 2010 Q2 2010 - -
Cyprus
Q4 2008 Q2 2009 Q4 2009 Q2 2010 Q4 2008 Q2 2009
Q4 2007   
Q1 2010
Q3 2008  
Q2 2010
Czech Republic Q3 2005   
Q4 2011
Q2 2006   
Q3 2012 Q4 2010 Q2 2011
Q2 2005       
Q1 2012
Q1 2006    
Q1 2013 Q2 2003 Q1 2004
Denmark
Q3 2001  
Q4 2011  
Q2 2012
Q1 2002   
Q4 2011   
Q3 2012 - -
Q3 2009     
Q3 2011
Q4 2009   
Q2 2012 Q3 2005 Q2 2006
Estonia Q2 2005   
Q2 2008
Q4 2005   
Q1 2010 Q2 2006 Q3 2007 Q1 2005 Q4 2005
Q2 2006    
Q1 2012
Q1 2007  
Q2 2013
Finland
Q4 2012 Q3 2013
Q1 2009  
Q3 2011
Q3 2009  
Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q3 2013
Q3 2008    
Q3 2011
Q3 2009   
Q2 2012
France NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Germany
Q1 2013 Q4 2013
Q1 2009  
Q1 2012
Q3 2009  
Q2 2012
Q2 2011      
Q1 2013
Q4 2011    
Q4 2013
Q3 2001    
Q4 2010   
Q1 2012
Q4 2001   
Q4 2010   
Q2 2012
Greece
Q3 2001  
Q2 2008  
Q4 2008    
Q2 2010
Q3 2001  
Q2 2008   
Q3 2009   
Q1 2011 Q1 2013 Q4 2013
Q3 2001      
Q2 2008      
Q2 2010
Q1 2002   
Q1 2009   
Q1 2011 Q1 2013 Q4 2013
Hungary
Q1 2007  
Q4 2008
Q4 2007  
Q4 2009 - -
Q4 2001      
Q4 2008
Q2 2002    
Q3 2009 Q4 2002 Q4 2003
Ireland Q3 2008   
Q4 2010
Q2 2009   
Q2 2011 Q1 2010 Q2 2010
Q4 2002      
Q1 2009       
Q4 2010
Q3 2003    
Q2 2009   
Q2 2011
Q1 2004   
Q1 2010
Q1 2005  
Q2 2010
Italy Q1 2010  
Q4 2011
Q3 2010   
Q2 2012
Q1 2011   
Q4 2012
Q2 2011   
Q3 2013
Q2 2002     
Q1 2010     
Q4 2011
Q2 2002   
Q3 2010  
Q2 2012





Q2 2008 Q1 2010
Q2 2004   
Q4 2005
Q1 2005   
Q3 2007 Q2 2008 Q1 2010 Q1 2006 Q3 2007
Lithuania
Q4 2008 Q1 2010 Q1 2006 Q3 2007 Q1 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2003 Q2 2004
Luxembourg
Q3 2010  
Q2 2011   
Q4 2012
Q3 2010   
Q2 2011  
Q3 2013
Q2 2009   
Q4 2011
Q3 2009  
Q2 2012 - - - -
Malta
Q3 2001  
Q3 2008  
Q4 2009   
Q1 2014
Q1 2002   
Q3 2008   
Q3 2010   
Q1 2014 Q1 2009 Q3 2009
Q2 2006      
Q1 2010
Q1 2007    
Q3 2010 Q4 2002 Q1 2003
Netherlands
Q1 2009  
Q3 2012
Q3 2009  
Q2 2013 Q1 2008 Q4 2008
Q2 2002      
Q4 2007      
Q3 2012
Q2 2002     
Q4 2007    
Q2 2013
Q3 2005    
Q4 2008
Q2 2006   
Q4 2008
Poland Q3 2009 Q2 2010 Q2 2007 Q1 2008 Q4 2009 Q2 2010 Q2 2007 Q1 2009
Portugal
Q1 2010 Q1 2011
Q3 2005   
Q1 2013
Q2 2007   
Q4 2013 Q1 2010 Q1 2011
Q1 2005   
Q1 2013
Q3 2005  
Q1 2013
Romania
Q1 2009 Q1 2010
Q3 2005  
Q4 2006   
Q2 2006  
Q4 2007
Q3 2004      
Q1 2009
Q2 2005    
Q1 2010 Q1 2007 Q3 2008
Slovakia Q1 2007  
Q4 2009
Q4 2007  
Q2 2010 Q1 2008 Q1 2009 Q1 2012 Q4 2012 Q4 2013 Q1 2014
Slovenia
Q3 2001  
Q2 2009   
Q4 2011
Q4 2001  
Q1 2010  
Q3 2012 Q2 2008 Q3 2008
Q2 2009     
Q3 2011
Q1 2010    
Q3 2012
Q3 2003    
Q1 2013
Q3 2004   
Q1 2014
Spain
Q3 2001  
Q2 2008  
Q2 2010   
Q4 2011
Q4 2001  
Q3 2008   
Q2 2010  
Q3 2012
Q2 2006   
Q2 2011  
Q1 2013
Q4 2006   
Q2 2011   
Q4 2013 
Q3 2001      
Q2 2008      
Q4 2011
Q2 2002   
Q1 2009     
Q3 2012
Q3 2004   
Q2 2006  
Q2 2011   
Q1 2013
Q3 2005  
Q4 2006  
Q2 2011  
Q4 2013
Sweden Q3 2009 Q1 2010 Q4 2007 Q1 2009 - - - -
United Kingdom Q1 2003 Q2 2003 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 - - Q1 2007 Q4 2007
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The blue line represents total inflows and the red line 
stands for private capital inflows. Private capital inflows are the 
financial account net of changes in Target2 balances and 
IMF/EU program disbursements. 
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Eurostat, 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Construction of sudden stops and bonanzas 
                            Year-over-year Change in Private capital inflows 
                             One Standard Deviation Bands 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Eurostat, Euro crisis monitor, 









lvix lm2 lgdpgrowth lconsumerconfidence lchangerating lchangepublicdebt
lvix 1,0000
lm2 -0,0062 1,0000
lgdpgrowth -0,2851 0,1503 1,0000
lconsumerconfidence -0,3143 0,3278 0,6825 1,0000
lchangerating -0,0735 0,1336 0,1954 0,1562 1,0000
lchangepublicdebt 0,1902 -0,2248 -0,2350 -0,2994 -0,0523 1,0000
Figure 3: Correlations Between Independent Variables 
